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To RANK PARI PASSU OR NOT TO RANK
PARI PASSU. THAT IS THE QUESTION IN
SOVEREIGN BONDS AFTER THE LATEST
EPISODE OF THE ARGENTINE SAGA
Dr. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal
"Justice is the crowning glory of the virtues."
CICERO (106-43 BC)
"And maybe people who might consider lending money to the Repub-
lic of Argentina in the future might realize what difficulties they're go-
ing to run into if they are naive enough to rely on what the Republic
offers."
HON. THOMAS P. GRIESA 1
I. INTRODUCTION
T can be said that the pari passu clause mistakenly migrated from
secured private lending to unsecured sovereign lending.2 Once
rooted in unsecured sovereign lending instruments, it faced certain
provisions similar to those in Spain or the Philippines, which allowed a
creditor to better position itself vis-d-vis other creditors, 3 and become a
1.Hon. Thomas P. Griesa, New York District Judge, on a hearing on January 12,
2006 in EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 03 CV 2S07 (TPG) (unreported hear-
ing); NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 03 CV 8845 (TPG) (unreported
hearing) & 05 CV 2434 (TPG).
2. See Lee Buchheit & Jeremiah Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt In-
struments, 53 EMORY L.J. 913 (2004).
3. Articles 913(4) of the Spanish Commercial Code and 1924(3)(a) of the Spanish
Civil Code refer to the preference of creditors whose credit is instrumented by
means of a public deed (notarized by a Notary Public). As noted by Wood, these
types of credits have a preference over those-although of the same type-not
instrumented in a public deed. See Philip Wood, International Loans, Bonds and
Securities Regulation: Law and Practice of International Finance, 41 (Sweet &
Maxwell 1995).
The Spanish Insolvency Law 22/2003 of July 9, 2003 amended section 1924 of the
Spanish Civil Code. Although under section 91of the new insolvency law a whole
new ranking of preferences, not including credits instrumented through public
deeds, is included-subsection (3)(a) of section 1924 of the Spanish Civil Code has
not been amended. Therefore, in the event of sovereign issuances-not subject to
insolvency laws-the un-amended section 1924(3)(a) of the Civil Code still applies.
The Philippines-strongly influenced by the Spanish Civil Code-have a norm
similar to the ones of Spain. Article 2244(14) of the Philippines Civil Code grants
priority to those credits that appear in a public instrument or a final judgment.
These two cases are the main reason of the emergence of the pari passu clause in
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'must have' provision in this type of debt instrument. Then, pari passu
clauses stayed in unsecured debt instruments due to the fear of the
earmarking revenues, or the risk of the sovereign, preferring a group of
creditors over another.4 These two fears were tackled by an expanded
negative pledge clause and the Libra Bank Limited v. Banco Nacional de
Costa Rica S.A. 5 and Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola
de Cartago6 cases. Therefore, if a proper due diligence was conducted;
there was no need to have a pari passu clause unless there was an excep-
tional circumstance, like the ones of Spain or the Philippines. Unfortu-
nately, a misguided interpretation of the pari passu clause in the Elliot
Associates LP v. Banco de la Naci6n y Repatblica del Perli case 7 opened
the door to litigation on incorrect grounds, which mainly focused on pay-
ment interpretation or broad interpretation of the pari passu clause. 8 It
was an 'aberration', but one that caused furor.9
In Elliot, there was no breach of the pari passu clause, but rather a
wrong understanding of its meaning. In the case of Argentina, the whole
story could be different since it can be correctly interpreted as a breach of
the pari passu clause in its ranking or narrow form. This article will focus
on the recent Argentine sovereign debt restructuring exercise that might
re-ignite litigation based on the pari passu clause. It is important to stress
the difference between the two scenarios, i.e. litigation pre and post Ar-
gentina's sovereign debt exchange offer. Pre-Argentina's litigation was
based on an incorrect interpretation of the pari passu clause made by a
Belgium court. Post-Argentina's potential litigation could be based on an
sovereign debt bond instruments. Buchheit and Pam also consider Argentina a
country that forced the inclusion of the pari passu clause since 1972, when they re-
enacted a practice dating back to 1862 where foreign creditors were subordinated
to local creditors in the bankruptcy of an Argentine debtor. See Buchheit, supra,
note 2 (quoting EMILIO J. CARDENAS, INTERNATIONAL LENDING: SUBORDINA-
TION OF FOREIGN CLAIMS UNDER ARGENTINE BANKRUPTCY LAW, IN DEFAULT
AND RESCHEDULING 63 (David Suratgar eds., 1984).
4. See WILLIAM TUDOR JOHN, SOVEREIGN RISK AND IMMUNITY UNDER ENGLISH
LAW AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 95-96 (Robert S. Rendell
ed., 2nd ed. 1983).
5. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
6. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), 757 F. 2d 516 (2d Cir.), 473 US 934 (1985).
7. Elliott Assoc. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F. Supp 1203 (S.D.N.Y 1996); Elliott Assoc.
v. Republic of Peru, 961 F. Supp 83 (S.D.N.Y 1997); Elliott Assoc. v. Republic of
Peru, 12 F. Supp 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y 1998); Elliott Assoc. v. Republic of Peru, 194
F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999); Elliott Assoc. v. Republic of Peru, 194 F.D.R. 116
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Elliot Assocs, L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR/92
(Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000), (not reported, on file
with the author).
8. See Buchheit, supra note 2; Philip Wood, Pari Passu Clauses-What Do They
Mean?, 18 Butterworths J. of Int'l Banking & Fin. L. 10 (2003); Pari Passu Clauses:
Analysis of the Role, Use and Meaning of Pari Passu Clauses in Sovereign Debt
Obligations as a Matter of English Law (Fin. Markets Law Comm't Issue 79, 2005),
available at www.fmlc.org [hereinafter Fin. Market Law Comm't Issue 79].
9. See Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Understanding the Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign
Debt Instruments: A Complex Quest, INT'L LAW. (forthcoming Fall 2009).
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actual breach of the pari passu clause. If this is the case, if there was an
actual breach of the pari passu clause, a new wake of litigation can be
triggered. This article is the second part of a study on the pari passu
clause in sovereign debt instruments. Part I was published by The Inter-
national Lawyer in the Fall Issue 2009, under the title Understanding the
Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments. A Complex Quest.10
II. ARGENTINA: A NEW CHAPTER IN THE PARI
PASSU SAGA?
On December 23, 2001, in an ill-famed assembly, the Argentine Con-
gress gave the President of the nation a standing ovation when he an-
nounced a moratorium on the Argentine sovereign debt. The message
given to the international investors who had decided to invest in Argen-
tine debt securities, however, was far from respectful to the rule of law.
A 38.4 percent of the defaulted debt was held by individuals and corpora-
tions domiciled in Argentina, while the rest was scattered throughout the
world."
To overcome the default status, Presidential Decree 1735/0412 ordered
the restructuring of two Argentine securities, first, debt instrumented in
the form of bonds, and second, payment of which had been deferred
under the provisions of Article 59 of Argentine Law No. 25,827.13 The
restructuring was carried out through a domestic and international ex-
change of sovereign debt bonds for new securities. The domestic ex-
change offer comprised three phases: 1) local debt,14 2) debt of political
subdivisions, and 3) and the international exchange offer.
On January 13, 2005,-after thirty-six months in default-Argentina
released, by means of Resolution 20/05 (issued by the Ministry of Econ-
omy), the final offering prospectus and supplement, including the terms
10. It is recommended that the two parts should be read as a whole, they each can be
accessed through Westlaw and Lexis Nexis.
11. See Dr. Guillermo Nielsen, Speech of Secretary of Finance: Argentina's Restruc-
turing Guidelines (Sept. 22 2003), available at http://www.argentinedebtinfo.gov.ar/
ingpresen.htm.
12. Presidential Decree 1725/04 (Dec. 9, 2004). A Spanish version is available at http://
www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/100000-104999/101861/norma.htm.
13. Law No. 25,829 (passed Nov. 26, 2003). A Spanish version is available at http://
www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/90000-94999/91229/texact.htm.
14. It was referred to as 'local debt' because either the creditors were: (1) Entities
registered in Argentina or Argentine residents; or (2) that the place of payment
was located within the Argentine territory. According to § 58 of Argentine Law
No. 24,156, public debt can be classified into internal and external debt as well as
direct and indirect debt. Internal debt is the debt owed to persons or legal entities
that reside or are registered within the territory of the Republic of Argentina and
that its payment can be claimed within the same territory. On the other hand,
external debt is the debt owed to another State, international institutions or per-
sons or legal entities that do not reside or are not registered within the territory of
the Republic of Argentina and that its payment can be claimed throughout the
territory of the Republic of Argentina. Direct public debt is the debt incurred
directly by the National Government as principal debtor. Indirect public debt is
any debt incurred by any person or entity-be it private or public-different from
the National Government but that the latter guarantees.
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and conditions of the exchange offer. The exchange was implemented
between January 14 and February 25, 2005, and obtained an acceptance
of 76.17 percent of the total eligible amount (approximately US$ 62,300
million). Argentina-inexplicably, in comparison to other default exper-
iences in the 1990s 5-stayed in a default situation for over three years
before concluding its exchange offer.
The Republic of Argentina exchanged 152 series of bonds, governed by
the laws of eight different countries, for an aggregate eligible amount
(representing par value plus accrued and unpaid interest) of approxi-
mately US$ 81,800 million,16 into a total of eleven series of Par Bonds,
Quasi Par Bonds and Discount Bonds and five series of GDP Linked
Units.17
This sovereign default has certain particular characteristics. For one, it
is the biggest default ever, in terms of monetary amounts and number of
creditors (over 700,000). Moreover, it has other complex characteristics:
(1) eight applicable laws; (2) the geographical distribution of creditors;
(3) the longest time elapsed before curing the default (thirty-seven
months); and, (4) a reduction in the acceptance percentage threshold
(from over ninety percent to 76.17%).
With regards to the first issue, Argentina defaulted on approximately
81,800 million US$ of debt obligations, while the second biggest bond
defaulter was Russia in 1998 with 31.6 billion US$. Argentina's default is
66.7% greater. Also, more than 700,000 creditors atomized within the
international financial community.' 8 The creditor's base in sovereign
debt episodes has been enlarged as the result of the Brady Plan, which
replaced sovereign syndicated loans with bonds. While syndicated loans
were held by a small group of banks, the bonds ended up being sold in
the secondary market to thousands of creditors. Due to the recurrent
need for external financing, Argentina's push for the atomization of cred-
itors that resulted from a bond issuance, was taken to an extreme. Ac-
cording to official data, institutional investors held fifty-six percent of the
eligible restructured debt, while the remaining forty-four percent is held
15. The longest default duration during the 1990s was the 1998 Russian default which
lasted eighteen months, followed by the 1999 Ecuadorian default which lasted ten
months. Ukraine and Pakistan's default lasted three months and one month,
respectively.
16. A complete list of the eligible debt is included as Annex A of Argentina's Prospec-
tus Supplement to the Prospectus dated December 27, 2004 of the Republic of
Argentina exchange offer to exchange eligible securities for Par Bonds due 2038,
Discount Bonds due December 2033, Quasi-Par Bonds due December 2045, and
GDP-linked Securities that expire in December 2035 [hereinafter Prospectus Sup-
plement] Article 60 of Argentine Law No. 25,827, however, states which debt in-
struments are excluded from the restructuring.
17. Argentine Ministry of Economy, Oferta de Canje-Anuncio Final 5 (Mar. 18,
2005).
18. Andrew Balls & Adam Thomson, Argentina Defiant Towards Private Creditors,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, available at http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=
Argentina+defiant+towards+private+creditors&id-040311000937&ct=0.
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by retail investors. 19







Furthermore, there were 152 different series of bonds, with eight differ-
ent governing laws: fifty-one percent of Argentine debt was subject to
New York law, eighteen percent to English Law, seventeen percent to
German law, eleven percent to Argentine law, two percent to Japanese
law, and the remaining one percent to Italian, Spanish, and Swiss law.20
The jurisdictions under which the debt instruments have been issued pro-
vide a good indication of which is the target market. This leads to the
issue of geographical distribution of creditors. Almost forty percent of
Argentine defaulted debt is held by Argentinean bondholders, and the
remaining sixty percent is distributed in at least eight countries: Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.21
BANKHOLDERS' GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
Unidentified Luxembourg






1.0% 9.1% UK |aa 10.3%
1.1% 3.1%
19. See Nielsen, supra note 11.
20. Id.
21. According to the data provided by the Argentine Ministry of Economy there is
12.8 percent that has not been geographically identified, and 2.5 percent that cor-
responds to other countries not listed above.
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Whether Argentina's situation, vis-A-vis holdouts, would have been dif-
ferent had the exit consents 22 mechanism been used is a conjectural mat-
ter, which only time will solve. The only thing that might be asserted in
the field of probabilities is that if the exit consents had been resorted to,
the number of holdouts would have been lower, as well as the number of
potential disputes. Possible collection attempts by the holdouts will re-
main latent until Argentina reaches a satisfactory agreement with each of
them.
Besides, there are many elements that might be taken into account in
connection with the level of acceptance, irrespective of the use-or not-
of the exit consents mechanism. Among other arguments, Argentina was
the country that obtained the largest haircut, since, if a comparison is
made between the seventy-five percent obtained in terms of par value
(sixty-six percent net present value) against Ecuador's forty percent or
Russia's thirty-six percent (Ukraine, Pakistan and Uruguay made no hair-
cut). Argentina's haircut was much larger, and this could have discour-
aged participation by certain creditors, who opted to recover their claims
through court actions. In addition, Argentina's debt restructuring was
the most complex one in terms of number of series (152) and creditors
(more than 700,000) scattered through various countries. It might be also
argued that the absence of dialogue with creditors may have affected the
level of participation. 23 Apart from the absence of dialogue with credi-
tors, the international markets will not easily forget the Executive
Branch's hostile attitude, even if it is used as a bargaining tool.
Another issue that is noteworthy, in light of the attachments decreed in
Brussels against the financial agents of the Republic of Peru and Nicara-
gua, is that in all the new bonds subject to New York and English law, the
22. Exit consent is a mechanism used in sovereign bond restructuring to enhance cred-
itor participation. It was used for the first time in Ecuador's debt restructuring in
2000. A further analysis on the extent and use of exit consent is provided infra.
23. See Arturo C. Porzecanski, Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of
Argentina's Default, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 311 (2005); see also Argentina's Foolish Debt
Gamble, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, available at http://www.ft.comlcms/.
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fiscal agent has been replaced with a trustee.24 The difference lies in the
fact that while a fiscal agent is an agent of the debtor (the sovereign), the
trustee acts on behalf of the creditors. Regretfully, in the case of Argen-
tina, this does not apply to those bonds that are subject to the Argentine
law. The only logical explanation is that although certain Argentine
courts have already ruled against the laws that declared an economic
emergency and which are the legal basis of the whole crisis legislation,
among which the rules that led to the restructuring are included, it is
highly unlikely that the Argentine Supreme Court would rule against
such laws if a suit is brought in Argentina.
Despite the tools available to restructure sovereign debt (exit consents,
term enhancers, etc.), the Argentine Government was unable to limit or
reduce to a minimum the threat posed by the holdouts. The greater the
amount of holdout creditors, the greater there is a possibility of being
threatened in a court. Besides, additional debt was issued locally while in
default, thus further extending the cure of the distressed situation. These
factors impacted on the risk rating of future issues and also affect the
debt rating assigned to private corporations.
As of December 31, 2001, Argentina's stock of debt was US$ 144.4
billion, while as of December 31, 2004, it was US$ 191.2 billion. Argen-
tina experienced an increase of US$ 46.8 billion, equivalent to a variation
of almost twenty-five percent in only three years.25 This increase in the
stock of debt occurred during a period of time where no principal or in-
terest payments were made on the defaulted debt. Not only did Argen-
tina fail to save the sums that were not repaid under the external debt,
but it also increased its indebtedness, the costs that a debt exchange im-
plies, and the amounts claimed in foreign courts (which are continuously
updated). 26 In sum, as it has been stated, '[t]he 'Lavagna' debt has fea-
tured the greatest historical increase within the shortest period of time.2 7
24. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Sovereign Bonds: A Critical Analysis of Argentina's
Bond Exchange Offer, 10 J. BANKING REG. 28 (2008).
25. See AdriAn Ventura, Encrucijada: por hechos mds o menos actuales como el corral-
ito, la pesificaci6n y el default, y por otros de larga data, en la Argentina hay miles
de millones en litigios, LA NACION, June 20, 2004, at 1, available at http://
www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?notaid=611711.
26. According to an unofficial report there are: (1) 327,250 suits in Argentine courts
claiming the total sum of US$ 7.3 billion. Also, there are 89,086 claims of uncertain
amount that should be added; (2) sixty-one claims in arbitral tribunals (CIADI and
others) filed by privatized companies in the amount of 14.2 billion US$ ; (3) claims
over 1 billion US$ filed in the courts of New York and Europe (Frankfort, Roma,
Milan, Florence and Vicenza); and, (4) claims filed by the argentine banks due to
their mismatches that resulted from the mandatory conversion of the deposits into
ARP and the result of judicial claims, which approximately total 7 billion US$
approximately. See Ignacio Molinari, La Deuda 'Lavagna', EL DIAL, Aug. 2004,
available at http://www.eldial.com/suplementos/economico/doctrina/ec040820-
d.asp.
27. 'Lavagana' refers to Rodolfo Lavagana who acted as Argentine Minister of Econ-
omy between April 16, 2002 and November 28, 2005, i.e. soon after the default up
to some months after the restructuring was settled. See id.
20091
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Apart from the outcome of the restructuring and the various opinions
that might have risen, there are other facts that should not be left unmen-
tioned. Although in the recent debt exchange Argentina has offered
bonds with forty-two years tenure, it should be borne in mind that none
of the major governments in Latin America has fully repaid a thirty-year
bond.28
Yet another significant aspect is that the debt/GDP ratio as of Decem-
ber 2001, was 62.4%, while after the exchange offer it stands at eighty-
eight percent,2 9 despite the seventy-five percent haircut on the par value
of the bonds. The debt/GDP ratio is used as an indicator of debt sus-
tainability. An extensive study by Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano con-
cluded that the debt/GDP ratio for Argentina-to be sustainable-
should be fifteen percent. 30
In connection with the foregoing, the same study has concluded that
default may become a way of living: The more it happens, the more it is
probable that it will happen again, since the debtor has less to lose and is
prone to defaulting again. 31 Argentina defaulted in 1982 during the
Malvinas/Falklands affair, in 1990 when they achieved a Brady deal in
1992, and again in 2001-2002.32 Since Argentina does not have a reputa-
tion of a country that serves its debt and abides by the rule of law, some-
one may wonder if it will default (or restructure) again in 2012, when its
ten year cycle becomes due again. On the contrary, as to its reputation, it
has been said that "Argentina emerged as the single most resistant debtor
in international finance. '' 33 One cannot ignore that Argentina has been
blessed during the last five years due to the liquidity abundance as result
of the favorable global economic situation and the ever high price of
commodities.
28. See A Victory by Default, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 2005.
29. The information used to determine the debt/GDP ratio of 2001 was: (1) The exter-
nal debt stock of Argentina expressed in US dollars; and (2) the GDP in constant
US$, both values provided by the IMF. The same formula used to calculate the
2001 debt/GDP ratio has been used to determine the debt/GDP ratio of 2004, but
based on the IMF forecasts for 2004 adjusted by the information on the post-ex-
change debt stock provided by the Argentine Ministry of Economy (as reported
Argentine Ministry of Economy, Oferta de Canje-Anuncio Final (Mar. 18, 2005)).
It is worth noticing that based only on the figures provided by the Argentine Min-
istry of Economy in the previously referred brief, the debt/GDP ratio for 2001 and
2004 would be 113 percent and 72 percent, respectively. The difference between
the figures quoted in this work and these of the Ministry of Economy result from
the fact that the Argentine Ministry of Economy used a GDP estimated at the
2004 real exchange rate while the figures of this work were calculated based on the
GDP in constant US dollars provided by the IMF.
30. Carmen M. Reinhart Et Al., Debt Intolerance, Brookings Papers on Economic Ac-
tivity, Aug. 2003, at 10.
31. Id.
32. It is worth mentioning that besides the Argentine default of 2001-2002, in early
June 2001, Argentina performed the so-called megacanje, a voluntarily mega bond
exchange offer to extend bond maturities and gain breathing space. Argentina
swapped existing bonds with an original value of 29.5 billion US$ for 31.04 billion
US$ of new instruments.
33. ERNEST J. OLIVERI, LATIN AMERICAN DEBT AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCE, 164 (1992).
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The role of the Argentine government should be to warrant the well-
being of society without compromising the property of future generations
and honoring its goodwill. These are two aspects that seem to have been
overlooked since December 23, 2001, to date, by the Argentine Govern-
ment. Holdouts are individual or institutional investors (e.g. pension
funds or vulture funds) exercising a right and seeking justice as result of a
breach to their contractual agreement. It is not that they should not be
compassionate with the debtor, but what happens when the debtor keeps
asking for forgiveness and promises that it will not happen again? The
answer is similar to Aesop's fable of The Shepherd Boy and the Wolf, that
nobody would believe in Argentina.
After providing a critical analysis of Argentina's most recent sovereign
debt restructuring episode, the next section will analyze the develop-
ments that took place during Argentina's default and its restructuring ex-
ercise vis-d-vis the pari passu clause.
III. MACROTECNIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND
EM LTD. V. ARGENTINA
The first issue to consider is the Macrotecnic International Corporation
and EM Ltd. v. Argentina cases. On January 15, 2004, upon the filing of
the memorandums of law of Argentina and the plaintiffs, the US State-
ment of Interest, 34 and the amicus curiae briefs filed by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York 35 and the New York Clearing House, 36 a New
York court was asked to consider whether the pari passu covenant in Ar-
gentina's bonds could not be used by judgment creditors as a legal basis
34. In the US statement of interests, it was stressed that "[a] novel reading of the pari
passu clause, however, that would prohibit sovereign debtors from making pay-
ments to third party creditors or require sovereign debtors to make simultaneous,
ratable payments to all creditors would undermine [a] well understood established
framework..." (see Statement of Interest of the United States at 14; Macrotecnic
Int'l Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 02 CV 5932 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12,
2004); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 03 CV 2507 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
12, 2004).
35. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York urged the court to interpret the pari passu
clause narrowly "so as to discourage the terrorism of payments and settlement
systems, and to encourage parties to compromise in sovereign debt restructurings"
(see Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae Federal Reserve Bank of New York
in Support of Defendant's Motion for an Order Pursuant to CPLR § 5240 Denying
Plaintiffs the Use of Injunctive Relief to Prevent Payments to Other Creditors at
13, Macrotecnic Int'l Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 02 CV 5932 (TPG)
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2004); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 03 CV 2507
(TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2004).
36. The New York Clearing House Association L.L.C. stated that its members "have
long understood [the pari passu] clause . . .to prohibit a debtor from creating un-
secured debt that ranks senior in legal rights of payment to the payment obliga-
tions the debtor has." See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae the New York
Clearing House Association L.L.C. in Support of Motion Pursuant to CPLR
§ 5240 to Preclude Plaintiff Judgment Creditors from Interfering with Payments to
Other Creditors at page 2, Macrotecnic Int'l Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, No.
02 CV 5932 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2004); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,
No. 03 CV 2507 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2004).
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to interfere with Argentina's payment of its other indebtedness. The
question one should ask is: should the Argentine Government continue
paying international organizations such as the IMF or other non-de-
faulted unsecured creditors as the holders of domestic bonds? Although
the court did not resolve the pari passu issue, the plaintiffs had to sign an
agreement giving the court thirty days notice before filing papers in-
tended to stop such payments under the pari passu clause. 37 Although
the core issue was not resolved, an order was issued by the court ordering
Argentina to divulge information about government property outside the
country that is used for commercial purposes: A discovery measure.
IV. THE ARGENTINE PROSPECTUS USED FOR THE
EXCHANGE OFFER
The Argentine Prospectus Supplement used for the exchange offer in-
cluded certain language that could be considered a common practice.
Nevertheless, if this language is analyzed under the subsequent develop-
ments, it turns relevant. This section analyses such language. In its Pro-
spectus Supplement, Argentina stressed its intentions vis-Ai-vis the
holdouts under the heading 'Risk Factor'. Argentina expressly stated
that:
Eligible Securities that are not tendered may remain in default indef-
initely. Eligible Securities not exchanged pursuant to the Offer will
remain outstanding. Argentina has announced that it has no inten-
tion of resuming payments on any Eligible Securities that remain
outstanding following the expiration of the Offer. Consequently, if
you elect not to tender your Eligible Securities pursuant to the Offer
there can be no assurance that you will receive any future payments
in respect of your Eligible Securities. If the Offer is completed, the
trading market for any series of Eligible Securities not exchanged
may become illiquid, which may adversely affect the market value of
any Eligible Securities of such series....38
Although this can be understood as a common practice to discourage
creditors from holding-out, special attention should be made to the word-
ing. All the risks (the 'threats' posed by the sovereign) are not actual and
are only potential. The language has been carefully chosen: 'May', 'no
intention', 'can', etc... The only time that 'will' has been used, no clarifi-
cation was made as to when: (1) 'Will remain outstanding' during the
exchange offer? (2) 'Will remain outstanding' until the settlement date?
(3) 'Will remain outstanding' during the first year after the settlement?
(4) 'Will remain outstanding' until enough pressure from international
organizations build up? Or, (5) 'will remain outstanding' forever? Since
it is not clear what 'will' means, there is only a potential risk. Creditors
37. Transcript of hearing before Judge Thomas P. Griesa at 9; Applestein v. Republic
of Argentina Province of Buenos Aires (S.D.N.Y. 15 January 2004) (No. 02 CV-
1773 (TPG)).
38. Prospectus Supplement, supra note 16.
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holding the bonds, however, would not care much because they already
have a right to claim as result of the contractual breach resulting from the
default. In any event, it will be reduced to a financial analysis as to what
is the best option for its interests (including recovery chances). This does
not pose any actual risk to trigger a breach of the pari passu clause in-
cluded in the so-called old bonds.
Argentina was trying to reassure the participating creditors that the
offer was the only possible choice and that there would not be a second
opportunity. Therefore, Argentina decided to also strengthen this posi-
tion by including a 'most favored' creditor clause. The analysis of this
clause follows.
V. THE 'MOST FAVORED CREDITOR CLAUSE'
In anticipation of the potential problems that might arise with hold-
outs, the 'most favored creditor's clause' is a clause that was included in
the Argentine Prospectus Supplement used for the exchange offer to set-
tle the Argentine exchange offer.39 This clause governs the treatment to
be afforded to those creditors who accepted the debt exchange offer, in
the event that after the exchange the Argentine Government decided to
make a new exchange offer or otherwise improve the conditions offered
to holdouts, in order to induce them to consent to and participate in the
debt exchange. The aim of this clause is to prevent those who decided to
participate in the exchange offer from suffering a loss in case of a subse-
quent improvement of the terms of the offer.
Since prior to the exchange offer there has been a big speculation
around the amount of creditors that would finally participate, the Argen-
tine Government decided to include this clause to prevent creditors from
not taking part in the exchange offer due to the possibility of making an
offer at a later stage to the holdout creditors with better terms and condi-
tions. The Argentine Government expressly stated on several occasions
(and particularly at the road show presentation of January 12, 200540),
that it would not make a new offer after launching the debt exchange and
that the 'most favored creditor clause' reaffirms the unique nature of the
offer. This clause will be applicable until December 31, 2014.41
The clause states that (emphasis added):4 2
1. Argentina reserves the right-in its absolute discretion-to: (a)
purchase; (b) exchange; (c) offer to purchase or exchange; or, (d)
enter into a settlement in respect of any eligible securities that are
not exchanged pursuant to the exchange offer. And-to the extent
39. See Prospectus Supplement supra note 16, at S-18, S-60.
40. Exchange Offer Presentation Performed by the Argentine Ministry of Economy
on 12 January 2005, available at http://www.argentinedebtinfo.gov.ar/documentosl
argentina roadshow_presentation-enero12 2005_v_final-web.pdf [hereinafter
Exchange].
41. See Prospectus Supplement, supra note 16.
42. See id.
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permitted by applicable law-to purchase or offer to purchase eli-
gible securities in the open market, in privately negotiated transac-
tions or otherwise.
Provided that:
2. Any such purchase, exchange, offer to purchase or exchange or set-
tlement will be made in accordance with applicable law.
3. The terms of any such purchases, exchanges, offers or settlements
could differ from the terms of the exchange offer.
Therefore,
4. Holders of the new bonds will be entitled to participate in any vol-
untary purchase, exchange, offer to purchase or exchange extended
to or agreed with holders of eligible securities not exchanged pur-
suant to the exchange offer [NOTE: the word settlement does not
appear in this paragraph].
The Argentine Government-on many occasions but particularly in
the exchange offer presentation,43 expressly argued that there will not be
any further exchange offers and that the 'most favored creditor clause'
reinforces this. The rights granted to holders of the new bonds extends
until December 31, 2014.4 4
It is worth noticing that the clause refers to the possibility of 'settle-
ments' with holders of the eligible securities (see 1, 2, and 3 above). But,
curiously, in the last part of the clause where the rights of the creditors
who decided to participate in the 'exchange offer are reinforced (see 4
above), the word 'settlement' is not included. This implies that it can be
understood, unless it is challenged and resolved by a court on the con-
trary, that the Argentine Government can reach a settlement with a
holdout creditor without triggering the applicability of this clause.
The Argentine Government enacted Presidential Decree 1735/04 on
December 9, 2004. This decree included in its Annex I an English version
of the latest draft of the Prospectus Supplement before being submitted
to the US Securities and Exchange Commission. In the last part of the
'most favored creditor clause,' as of that date, holders of the new securi-
ties were entitled to "participate in any voluntary purchase, exchange,
offer to purchase or exchange or settlement extended to or agreed with
holders of [e]ligible securities not exchanged," pursuant to the exchange
offer. As of that date, the word 'settlement' was still included in the
draft. 45
Therefore, the clause that was originally included to protect creditors'
rights produced exactly the contrary. These type of amendments to a
draft prospectus supplement, i.e. the elimination of a word in complex
documents drafted by various highly qualified professionals and reviewed
43. Exchange, supra note 40.
44. See Prospectus Supplement, supra note 16.
45. Global Position on Argentina Bondholders, Position Paper: Most Favorite Credi-
tor Clause (Jan. 31, 2005), http://www.tfargentina.it/download/GCAB%20Most
%20Favored%20Creditor%20Clause%20paper%201-31-05.pdf.
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by several experts, cannot be considered as an involuntarily omission.
Due to a last-minute amendment, the clause that was intended to provide
increased assurances to creditors finally produced exactly the contrary.
VI. LAW 26,017 ('PADLOCK LAW') AND THE IMF
In view of the potential ineffectiveness of the 'most favored creditor
clause', the Argentine Government passed Law No. 26,017,46 also known
as the Padlock Law, which prevents the Argentine Executive Branch
from reopening the exchange process or making any kind of court, out-
of-court or private transaction, or settlement with respect to the bonds
subject to the exchange offer. This law intended to send a message to the
creditors during the exchange process, the moment where the law was
passed and promulgated, which assured creditors that their rights would
not be breached. In other words, those that decide not to participate in
the exchange offer (i.e. holdouts) would not have a second chance.
Although the passage of Law 26,017 solves the difficulty raised by the
language of the 'most favored creditors' clause' included in the Prospec-
tus Supplement, it prevents the Argentine Government from meeting the
International Monetary Fund's (IMF) requirement of providing a solu-
46. Padlock Law. Law No. 26017, Feb. 10, 2005 (promulgated on Feb. 10, 2005). The
following is a free translation:
ARTICLE 1--Notwithstanding the validity of other applicable norms, the sov-
ereign bonds eligible for the exchange offer established by Decree No. 1735
dated 9 December 2004, that were not tendered according to what has been
established in said decree will be subject to the provisions of this law.
ARTICLE 2-The national Executive Branch shall not re-open the exchange
offer established under Decree 1735/04, in relation to the bonds referred in arti-
cle 1 hereof.
ARTICLE 3-The National Government is prohibited from performing any
type of judicial, extra-judicial or private transaction in relation to the bonds re-
ferred in article 1 of this law.
ARTICLE 4-The National Executive Branch shall, according to the terms of
the issuance of the bonds and the applicable norms in each jurisdiction, pass the
required administrative acts and adopt the required measures to de-list from all
stock exchanges-local or foreign-the bonds mentioned in the previous
article."
ARTICLE 5-The National Executive Branch will send a report to the honora-
ble National Congress reflecting the effects of the exchange offer and the new
levels of debt and its decrease.
ARTICLE 6-Notwithstanding what has previously been established, eligible
sovereign bonds as established by Decree No. 1735/04 that were deposited under
any cause or title under the name of any instance, type or jurisdiction's court,
whose legally owners had not adhered to the exchange offer referred by the
previously mentioned decree nor had expressly stated their will of not taking
part in the exchange offer on the judicial file, before the closing date according
to what has been established in the timetable of the referred decree No. 1735/04,
will be replaced as a matter of law by "STEP UP PAR BONDS 2038 of the
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC" according to the conditions set forth for the alloca-
tion, settlement and issuance of said bonds by means of Decree No. 1735/04 and
its complementary norms.
The Ministry of Economy and Production has the right to pass the required
complementary norms to implement the exchange ordered by this article.
ARTICLE 7-Decree No. 1733 dated 9 December 2004 is hereby ratified.
ARTICLE 8-Inform the National Executive Branch.
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tion to those creditors who decided not to participate in the exchange
offer. Failing to provide a solution to those creditors who did not partici-
pate in the exchange would breach the principle of 'good faith' estab-
lished by the IMF in its lending into arrears policy. 47 This resulted in a
formal action of what was originally materializing the language of the
Prospectus Supplement that expressly provided that "[e]ligible
[s]ecurities that are not tendered may remain in default indefinitely," '48
and by Argentina's written refusal to reopen the exchange to those credi-
tors who originally decided not to participate.
On December 15, 2005, Argentina announced that it will pre-pay the
outstanding balance of payments with the IMF in the amount of 9.9 bil-
lion US$. The payment was performed on January 3, 200649, using free
central bank reserves in order to-as stated by the Argentine Presi-
dent5°-to gain 'autonomy' from IMF policies.
Decree 1599/05, amended law 23,928, established what are considered
free central bank reserves, and Decree 1601/05 instructed the Argentine
Central Bank to cancel the outstanding debts with the IMF. Decree 1599/
05 was ratified by the Argentine Congress by means of Law 26,076. Cen-
tral Bank reserves (gold and foreign currency) should support 100% of
the monetary base. 51 Those reserves in excess of the monetary base and
that are not used for support purposes are considered free reserves.
52
Central bank reserves and free reserves cannot be frozen or attached, and
if they produce a neutral effect, they can be used to pay international
financial institutions.53
Using reserves of the Central Bank to pay the IMF is a common prac-
tice since sovereigns usually use their central banks (or the body perform-
ing those functions) as its financial agent.5 4 The Central Bank borrows
47. In this regard see International Monetary Fund, Executive Board Meeting 89/61,
24 May 1989; International Monetary Fund, Fund Policy on Sovereign Arrears to
Private Creditors (SM/98/8); International Monetary Fund, The Acting Chair-
man's Summing Up on Fund Policy on Arrears to Private Creditors-Further Con-
siderations (EBM 99/64, 14 June 1999); International Monetary Fund, Fund Policy
on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors-Further Consideration of the Good
Faith Criterion, prepared by the International Capital Markets, Policy Develop-
ment and Review and Legal Departments (in consultation with the other Depart-
ments) and approved by Gerd Hausler, Timothy Geithner, and Franqois Gianviti,
30 July 2002.
48. See Prospectus Supplement, supra note 16, at S-29.
49. See, Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina, Central Bank discusses the can-
cellation of Argentina's debt maintained with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), Communication No. 48,447 (Mar. 1, 2006).
50. Speech of Nestor Kirchner, President of the Republic of Argentina; see also, His-
t6rico: El Pais saldard en un s6lo pago la deuda con el FMI, LA NACION available
at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/nota.asp?nota-id=765314.
51. Law 23,928, art. 4.
52. Id. art. 5.
53. Id. art. 6.
54. Section G-1 of the By-laws Rules and Regulations of the IMF reads as follows:
"G-1. Each member shall designate a fiscal agency in accordance with Article V,
Section 1, and may change the agency after notifying the Fund," available at IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/rr07.htm.
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from the IMF and in turn transfers the borrowings to the sovereign. In
return it receives an obligation for repayment from the sovereign.55
There was an unsuccessful attempt from NML Ltd.56 and EM Capital
Ltd.57 to freeze Argentina's central bank reserves in New York arguing
that the enacted decrees and Law 26,076 have changed the nature of
funds deposited in the United States from central bank reserves to funds
of the sovereign. This argument is not entirely accurate because as previ-
ously noted, it is a central bank function protected by §1611(b)(1) of the
US Foreign State Immunity Act of 1976 to perform payments to interna-
tional financial institutions. Also, the Argentine norms were only
amended to permit a greater portion of reserves to be used for
repayments.
The pre-payment implied the following accounting steps: (1) money
was deducted from the assets column in the balance sheet of the Central
Bank of Argentina (that was the reason Law 23,928 was amended by
means of Decree 1599/05 and ratified by Law 26,076); and (2) the same
amount was cancelled from the liabilities column (the Central Bank was
instructed to pay the IMF according to Resolution 49/05 of the Ministry
of Economy and Decree 1601/05). Nevertheless, this over simplistic exer-
cise also implied that a credit in the same amount was written in the asset
column, i.e., the debt 'owed' by the government to the central bank re-
sulting from the payment which was performed on its behalf and was in-
strumented by debt instruments due in 2016 (Resolution 49/05 of the
Ministry of Economy and Joint Resolution Nos. 1/2006 and 4/2006 of the
Finance and Treasury Secretariats). 58
In theory this was not much more than just an accounting exercise and
since a payment was done, less money was available. Due to the financial
situation of the government, however, it required a new issuance of debt
at a higher interest rate. It is important to stress that the monies owed to
the IMF were not due, and therefore there was no reason for a pre-pay-
ment other than a politically motivated decision. In order to materialize
this payment, Argentina issued debt locally that was allocated to certain
55. In the case of Argentina, the obligation for repayment was instrumented by means
of a debt title issued as per Joint Resolution Nos. 1/2006 and 4/2006 of the Finance
and Treasury Secretariats.
56. NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 03 CV 8845 (TPG) (unreported hear-
ing) & 05 CV 2434 (TPG).
57. Hon. Thomas P. Griesa, New York District Judge, on a hearing on Jan 12, 2006,
supra note 1.
58. For an explanation on the credits and debits, see Argentina's Central Bank's bal-
ance sheet for the fiscal year ended on December 31, 2006, particularly section 2.1.
of the Notes to the Financial Statements, available at http://www.bcra.gov.ar/.
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governmental institutions59 and Venezuela. 60 Therefore, 'less money, less
debt' translates into 'less money, less debt, and higher debt service costs.'
Due to political reasons, Argentina decided to change one creditor for
others at a higher interest rate.61
It can be argued if it was or was not a correct decision, but it is arguable
and it can be analyzed from different angles (political, financial, etc.).
Nevertheless, besides the recount of facts, it is important to analyze
whether the Padlock Law implied a violation of the pari passu clause.
VII. DID THE PADLOCK LAW VIOLATE THE PARI PASSU
CLAUSE INCLUDED IN ARGENTINE BOND INSTRUMENTS?
This section will analyze the potential vulnerability of Argentina to a
pari passu attack, i.e., a creditor initiating a claim against Argentina on
the basis of the pari passu clause included in the debt instruments. For
this purpose, it is necessary to analyze first why Argentina did not resort
to the market-oriented established techniques to enhance participation of
creditors by means of discouraging holdout creditors. These are: (1) the
use of CACs; and (2) exit consent or exit amendments. Subsequently, the
analysis of the particular case of Argentina and the risks that it faces vis-
i-vis the enforcement of the pari passu clause will be analyzed.
A. COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES
Collective action clauses (CAC)'s are clauses that if included in the
prospectuses of the bonds, the interaction of the bondholders is required.
There are four different types of CACs. These are:62 (1) collective repre-
sentation clauses;63 (2) majority action clauses; (3) sharing clauses; 64 and
(4) acceleration clauses.65 Within CACs majority action clauses are the
59. These governmental institutions include the National Pension Fund (ANSeS), the
Argentine Tax Authority (AFIP), a trust created by the government for the
strengthening of troubled companies (Fondo Fiduciario para la Reconstrucci6n de
Empresas), a trust created by the government for the development of transport
infrastructure (Fondo Fiduciario de Infraestructura de Transporte), Home Office
(Ministerio del Interior), National Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA).
See Joint Resolution Nos. 11/2005 and 41/2005 of the Finance and Treasury Secre-
tariats. See also El Tesoro coloca nueva deuda, LA NACI6N, Jan. 4, 2006, available
at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/economia/nota.asp?notaid=769696; El Gobierno
emite titulos por $3.147 millones para financiarse', INFOBAE, Dec. 31, 2005.
60. See Larry Rohter, As Argentina's Debt Dwindles, President's Power Steadily
Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006.
61. Although some governmental bodies received a low interest rate, for example,
Venezuela was paid an interest rate amounting to the double of what was being
paid to the IMF. See id..
62. See Liz Dixon & David Wall, Collective Action Problems and Collective Action
Clauses, FIN. STABILrry REV. (2000).
63. The collective representation clause is intended to coordinate representation of
the bondholders as a group.
64. This type of clauses establish that any proceed obtained from the debtor would be
shared among all the creditors on a pro-rata basis.
65. This is a common type of clause included in U.S. bonds issued through a Fiscal
Agent agreement that requires a 25 % of the outstanding bonds to accelerate un-
matured principal upon an event of default.
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type of clauses that have been strongly pursued by the official sector and
many academics, and they were effectively incorporated in bond issu-
ances. Due to the scope of this article, special focus will be provided to
these clauses.
Majority action clauses enable the amendment of any of the terms and
conditions of the bonds, including the payment terms, if the required ma-
jority therein established is obtained. The origin of these clauses under
English law can be traced back to 1879, as the result that debtors facing
liquidity problems were faced with one sole alternative: Liquidation.66 In
the United States, the use of majority action clauses in sovereign bonds
was not widely accepted as in English law due to Section 316(b) of the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA)67 that expressly states that the amount
due under a publicly-issued corporate bond cannot be affected without
the consent of each bondholder (i.e. 100%) and provides that a defer-
ment of a maximum of three years is acceptable upon the approval of
seventy-five percent of the bondholders. 68 As noted by Buchheit and
Gulati, "although the TIA is not applicable to foreign sovereign bonds
issued in the US, the amendment clauses included in such sovereign
bonds have almost invariably followed the TIA-driven approach to
amendments." 69
In 2003, with the bond issuances of Mexico 70 and Brazil,71 CACs were
broadly incorporated in sovereign bonds issued under New York law.
The path set forth by Mexico and Brazil was rapidly followed by Belize,
Egypt, Korea, Lebanon, Qatar, South Africa, and many more thereafter.
Before 2003, only bonds subject to English law and a group of less promi-
66. See SIR FRANCIS B. PALMER, COMPANY PRECEDENTS FOR USE IN RELATION TO
COMPANIES SUBJECT TO THE COMPANIES ACTS 1862 TO 1900: WITH COPIOUS
NOTES, STEVENS AND SONS (9th ed. 1903).
67. Trust Indenture Act § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa.
68. Section 316(b) of the TIA reads as follows: "Notwithstanding any other provision
of the indenture to be qualified, the right of any holder of any indenture security to
receive payment of the principal of and interest on such indenture security, on or
after the respective due dates expressed in such indenture security, or to institute
suit for the enforcement of any such payment on or after such respective dates,
shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder, except as to a
postponement of an interest payment consented [by holders of not less than sev-
enty-five per centum in principal amount of the indenture securities], and except
that such indenture may contain provisions limiting or denying the right of any
such holder to institute any such suit, if and to the extent that the institution or
prosecution thereof or the entry of judgment therein would, under applicable law,
result in the surrender, impairment, waiver, or loss of the lien of such indenture
upon any property subject to such lien". According to section 316(a), paragraph 2,
the postponement of any interest payment could not exceed three years from its
due date.
69. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51
EMORY L. J. 4, 1329 (2002) (on file with the author).
70. United Mexican States, $1,000,000,000 6.625% Global Notes due 2015. See Pro-
spectus and Prospectus Supplement (Dec. 4, 2002), SEC Registrations Registration
No. 333-101643 and 333-83312 (on file with the author).
71. Federative Republic of Brazil, 10 % Global Bonds due 2007, US$ 1,000,000,000,
Prospectus, Feb. 12 2003 and Prospectus Supplement dated 29 April 2003), SEC
File No. 333-81140 (on file with the author).
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nent issuers in their New York law bonds 72 included CACs allowing the
amendment of any term, even the payment terms.
CACs have been in English bonds since the 19th century and only re-
cently in bonds subject to New York law. As previously mentioned this
was due to Section 316(b) of the TIA. But what made everyone change
their minds? There are various factors that drove to this change in boiler-
plate contracts. Gelpern and Gulati have recorded them in a comprehen-
sive study.73 The most salient of these reasons are: (1) because they were
the lesser of two evils, being the other the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism proposed by the IMF74; and (2) arm twisting U.S. pressure 75
and/or quid pro quo.7 6 In addition, it should also be borne in mind that
sovereign bond restructuring was becoming a recurrent issue (Russia-
1988, Ukraine-1999, Pakistan-1999, Ecuador-2000, and Argentina-
2001-2002); key and reputable players were involved in their endorse-
72. These less prominent issuers include Bulgaria, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Lebanon and
Qatar. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A
Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627, 1641 (2006).
73. Gelpern &Gulati, supra note 72.
74. Blustein argues that "[t]he idea of introducing the clauses had been proposed years
earlier and had stalled amid opposition from Wall Street; only when the more radi-
cal SDRM reared its head did private financiers come around to backing CACs as
the lesser evil." See Paul Blustein, And the Money Kept Rolling In (and Out): Wall
Street, the IMF and the Bankrupting of Argentina, PUBLIC AFFAIRS 230 (2005)).
Also, an article published by The Economist expressly asked the question of why
there has been a wide adoption of CACs by borrowers. In its own words, it was
stated "[w]hy have borrowers changed their minds? One reason is fear. Once the
SDRM was mooted-a far worse idea than collective-action clauses in borrowers'
eyes-the thought that it might be put into effect focused minds on the search for a
market-based alternative." See Dealing With Default, ECONOMIST, May 8, 2003, at
63.
75. Not everything is a bed of roses in the international financial markets, as it was
reported that the inclusion of CACs in Chilean bonds ". . . means that the Chilean
authorities are bowing to pressure from the US Treasury, which has been pushing
for all emerging-market issuers to include such clauses." Nick Ashwell, Chile
Places First Sovereign Bond with Collective Action Clause, WORLD MARKETS RE-
SEARCH CENTRE (Global Insight), Jan. 27, 2004. In the same line of thinking,
Skeel Jr. stated that "[w]ith some serious arm-twisting by the US Treasury, Mexico
broke the logjam in 2003..." See David Skeel Jr., Why Contracts are Saving Sover-
eign Bankruptcy, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 24-32 (2006); and, Blustein noted that
"[e]ventually, with U.S. clout working its usual magic, CACs won endorsement
from the G-7 and the IMF's policysetting committee of member-country finance
ministers, and several emerging-market countries began issuing bonds with the
clauses in 2003." SeeBlustein, supra note 74. Also, in this regard, the Economist
stated that "American pressure also played a part: the Treasury made no secret of
its preference for the new clauses." See Dealing With Default, supra note 74.
Authers in the FT stated that CACs resulted "as an alternative to the IMF's bank-
ruptcy proposal and that it would help shield investors from the risk of IMF inter-
vention." See John Authers, Mexico Sends Signal with Bond Clauses, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2003, at 31.
76. Authers, quoting an interview to Walter Molano (from BCP Securities) stated that
"Mexico is building up a war-chest of favours to the US Treasury, which it's going
to claim... in the future... [t]his deal is going to be an orchestrated success, be-
cause there's an enormous amount of political reputation riding on this, specifi-
cally for the US Treasury." See Authers, supra note 75, at 31.
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ment (G-10 drafting group, 77 law firms dealing with sovereign issuances, 78
and big institutional investors79); the possibility of fearing rogue debtors
(Argentina and its defiant position against creditors80) and to a certain
extent-as in the case of the pari passu clause-by inadvertence. 81
Additionally, also in 2003, Uruguay re-profiled all of its outstanding
sovereign debt and included CACs in the terms of the new bonds. This
means that future debt restructuring can be performed in an orderly man-
ner by just tendering the votes of the bondholders without having to re-
sort to an exchange offer. Moreover, this would eliminate the problem of
the holdouts since an agreeing majority would bind all the dissenting
creditors.8 2
So far, the required threshold to amend the terms of the bonds contain-
ing CACs has been seventy-five percent in aggregate principal amount of
the outstanding bonds (e.g. Egypt, Lebanon, Mexico, Qatar, Uruguay,
etc). Brazil has been the only case where an eighty-five percent rate has
been required.
Uruguay is a unique case since by way of an aggregation mechanism,
amendments to any terms (including payment terms) can be incorporated
to one or more series of bonds simultaneously. In order to approve an
amendment applicable to two or more series, a double majority is re-
quired: (1) eighty percent of the aggregate principal amount of all af-
fected series; and (2) 66 percent of each specific series.8 3
77. In 2002 the Ministers and Governors of the G10 group of countries established the
G10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses under the chairmanship of Randy
Quarles (US Treasury) to consider how sovereign debt contracts could be modified
in order to make the resolution of sovereign debt crises more orderly.
78. Mainly (in alphabetical order): Arnold & Porter, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamil-
ton, and Sullivan & Cromwell.
79. An article published by the Wall Street Journal places Mohamed E1-Erian, head of
emerging markets at Pimco, as the leading player managing the biggest fund in-
vesting in emerging market sovereign debt. The article claims that Mr. EI-Erian
has been able to negotiate directly with countries issuing the bonds, rather than
accepting pre-determined terms. The article quotes a banker familiar with the
Mexican bond deal who said that "was really driven by Pimco's need for invest-
ment rather than by Mexico's need for financing." See Craig Karmin, Power
Player: A Fund Chief Flexes Muscles When Countries Need a Loan--Pimco's El-
Erian Sets Terms Usually Shaped by Bankers In Emerging-Market Debt--Some
Critics Call Him a Bully, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2004, at Al.
80. See Arturo C. Porzecanski, supra note 23. See also Argentina's Foolish Debt Gam-
ble, supra note 23.
81. As noted by Gelpern and Gulati, a London office of a New York Law Firm was
doing New York law deals, by cutting and pasting contract terms from an English
law form. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, supra note 72.
82. Rodrigo Olivares Caminal, Reestructuraci6n de Deuda Pdblica: Diferentes Mecan-
ismos, LA LEY (Argentina), Nov. 2003, at 97.
83. Uruguay's modifications clause reads as follows: "... Any modification, amend-
ment, supplement or waiver to the terms and conditions of the debt securities of a
single series, or to the indenture insofar as it affects the debt securities of a single
series, may generally be made, and future compliance therewith may be waived,
with the consent of Uruguay and the holders of not less than 66-2/3% in aggregate
principal amount of the debt securities of such series at the time outstanding.
However, special requirements apply with respect to any modification, amend-
ment, supplement or waiver that would [modify the 'reserve matters' (i.e. change
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Unfortunately, the Argentine bonds subject to New York law did not
include CACs, and in the case of those subject to English law, the Argen-
tine government feared the possibility of having to face a blocking hold-
ing, which is what happened in the case of the use of exit consent.84 The
analysis on the use of exit consent as a restructuring technique and the
threat of blocking holdings is explained below.
B. EXIT CONSENT
Exit consent is the technique by which holders of bonds in default
which have accepted an exchange offer-at the moment of accepting said
offer-grant their consent to amend certain terms of the bonds to be re-
structured. By using the exit consent technique, the exchange offer is
conditioned to a minimum threshold of creditors' acceptance and the
amendments to the terms are performed once the required majority has
been obtained.
By means of these amendments, the defaulted bonds subject to the ex-
change offer are less attractive (in legal and financial terms), forcing a
greater number of bondholders to accept the exchange offer. Otherwise,
if bondholders do not accept the exchange offer, they will be holding an
impaired bond lacking some of the original contractual enhancements.
Due to the extensive time elapsed since the announcement of the mor-
atorium and the implementation of the exchange offer, Argentina could
not make an exchange proposal by availing itself of the use of exit con-
the date of payment; reduce the principal amount or redemption price or pre-
mium; reduce the portion of the principal amount which is payable in the event of
an acceleration; reduce the interest rate; change the currency or place of payment
of any amount payable; change the obligation to pay additional amounts; change
the definition of 'outstanding' or the percentage of votes required for the taking of
any action; authorize the trustee to exchange or substitute all the debt securities or
convert all the debt securities into other obligations; or change the pari passu rank-
ing, governing law, submission to jurisdiction or waiver of immunities provisions)]
.. Any reserve matter modification to the terms and conditions of the debt securi-
ties of a single series, or to the indenture insofar as it affects the debt securities of a
single series, may generally be made, and future compliance therewith may be
waived, with the consent of Uruguay and the holders of not less than seventy-five
percent in aggregate principal amount of the debt securities of such series at the
time outstanding. If Uruguay proposes any reserve matter modification to the
terms and conditions of the debt securities of two or more series, or to the inden-
ture insofar as it affects the debt securities of two or more series, in either case as
such modifications may be made, and future compliance therewith may be waived,
for any affected series if made with the consent of Uruguay and: the holders of not
less than eighty-five percent in aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt
securities of all series that would be affected by that reserve matter modification
(taken in aggregate), and the holders of not less than 66-2/3% in aggregate princi-
pal amount of the outstanding debt securities of that series (taken individually)."
See Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus Dated April 10, 2003, Reflecting the ad-
ditional filings made with the SEC pursuant to Rule 424(b)(3) on April 15, 2003,
April 25, 2003 and May 9, 2003, available at http://www.bcu.gub.uy/autoriza/sgoioi/
reperfilamiento/ultimosup.pdf, pages S-39 to S-40.
84. For purposes of this article, Argentine bonds subject to German law and Japanese
law are comparable to bonds issued under New York law and English law,
respectively.
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sents, as was done by Ecuador and Uruguay (and to a certain extent
Ukraine). 85 The reason for this was that the delay in the implementation
of the debt restructuring by Argentina resulted in the alignment of those
bondholders who opposed the restructuring and held sufficient majority
for preventing an amendment to the terms and conditions of the de-
faulted bonds ('blocking holdings'). This did not permit Argentina to
make an exchange offer using a combined mechanism with the use of exit
consents. Hence, Argentina lost the chance to use the mechanism that
would have lessened the holdout problem discouraging the non-accepting
creditors without affecting the payment terms, provided that the required
percentage to amend the terms and conditions of the prospectus was
obtained.
For this reason, on November 15, 2004, Argentina filed a Memoran-
dum of Law with the District Court of the Southern District of New York
in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.8 6 Argen-
tina confirmed that it would not use exit consents in their final exchange
offer launched on January 12, 2005.87 The relevant part of Memorandum
states:
Plaintiffs' ex parte motion for a preliminary injunction is based on
their incorrect speculation that the Republic's as-yet unannounced
Exchange Offer will contain 'exit consents' that will somehow inflict
irreparable harm upon them. Of course had plaintiffs simply waited
until the November 29 launch of the Exchange Offer (which is not
scheduled to close until 2005) they would have learned what the Re-
public has publicly confirmed: the Exchange Offer will not include
exit consents.88
Had it resorted to the exit consents mechanism, Argentina would have
been able to increase the number of participants by amending the ex-
change offer terms (without changing the payment conditions); therefore
dispiriting those who had decided not to participate. 89 Ecuador and Uru-
guay made use of the exit consents and obtained ninety-seven percent
and ninety-three percent participation, respectively. Ukraine, which used
a mechanism similar to the exit consents that included the grant of irrevo-
85. The leading case on exit consents is Katz v. Oak Industry Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del.
Ch. 1986), where the validity and legitimacy of using this technique was recognized
in a case of commercial bonds. Subsequently, New York courts have recognized its
validity in many cases, such as Unigard Security Insurance Co., Inc. v. North River
Insurance Co., 4 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993). In Unigard, the court recognized the
argument that the use of exit consents is legitimate because the drafters of the
terms and conditions of the bonds issued after the Oak Industries case did not
make any amendments to the contractual terms of the bonds to limit the use of
exit consents. Countries which have used exit consents in cases of sovereign debt
restructuring include Ecuador and Uruguay.
86. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary
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cable mandates, obtained ninety-five percent of participation. As men-
tioned above, Argentina obtained a 76.17 percent acceptance level.
Although this participation percentage might lead to infer that it would
have obtained the 66 2/3 percent required to amend the terms of the
bonds under New York law, this does not necessarily imply that upon
disaggregating each of the series it might have also achieved the required
percentage.
The use of exit consents and CACs have curtailed to certain extent the
power of holdouts in a sovereign debt restructuring. In addition, the use
of a trust structures, particularly with the features of Grenada's issuance
in 2005 and subject to New York law, does not provide individual en-
forcement rights for bondholders (i.e. all enforcement rights vest only
with the trustee and may be exercised solely for the ratable benefit of all
bondholders only if a demand is made by holders of at least twenty-five
percent of the outstanding amount of the bonds). 90
VIII. THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE AFTER THE ARGENTINA
SAGA: THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS
Without having the possibility of using CACs or exit consents, Argen-
tina had run out of options to enhance creditor participation. The only
option left was to creatively use the terms of the bonds. Therefore, upon
a desperate situation, Argentina resorted to a desperate measure. By
passing Law 26,017, Argentina was trying to reassure participating credi-
tors that the offer was the only possible choice. However, something that
seemed so simple (like passing a law to gain credibility and leave in the
past the blunder with the wording of the 'most favored creditor' clause of
the prospectus) might be the center stage for a potential pari passu
attack.
Argentina made it clear that there was no intention of resuming any
payments to the holdouts, which can be implied from both the formal
prohibition of any further transactions included in the Padlock Law and
the wording under the 'Risk Factors' section in the Prospectus Supple-
ment. The combination of these two factors, however, could result in a
formal subordination of the bonds held by those that decided not to par-
ticipate in the exchange offer.
Subordination, as defined in the Black's Law Dictionary, is "the act or
an instance of moving something (such as the right or claim) to a lower
rank, class or position."91 As noted in In re Enron Corp., the
"[s]ubordination of a claim alters the otherwise applicable priority of that
claim within a creditor class; a subordinated claim receives a distribution
only after the claims of other creditors have been satisfied. ' '92 Subordina-
tion is a common feature in debt financing. As noted by Schnebel, "when
90. See Offering Memorandum from Grenada to exchange its 9.375 percent Notes due
2012 for US$ and XCD bonds due 2025, Enforcement 64 (on file with the author).
91. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1440 (7th ed. 1999).
92. In re Enron Corp., 333 B.R. 205, 233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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there are two are more creditors of a common borrower, conflicts will
invariably exist."'93 This is the reason why inter-creditor agreements, i.e.
agreements to rule the relationship among creditors of a same owner,
have developed and, in certain complex financial structures, become very
common (e.g. when mezzanine debt is used).
In the process of providing various financing sources, the debtor and its
creditors will try to set an order of priority in the event that something
goes wrong. This gave rise to various types of corporate debt financing
with different priority ranks based on the risk/return trade-off,94 e.g. (in
order of priority) senior debt, second lien, mezzanine finance, high yield
debt, payment-in-kind notes, shareholders loans, and equity.
The priority of claims becomes relevant upon a state of insolvency (in
the case of corporations) or default (in the case of sovereigns). 95 In the
case of insolvency, section 726 of the US Bankruptcy Code 96 describes
the priority of claims, with the exception of allowed secured claims that
are satisfied by or from the collateral. 97
The exception to the general system of priorities is contemplated under
Section 510 of the US Bankruptcy Code,98 which provides for the subor-
dination of claims on a contractual or consensual basis (Section 510(a)),
or an equitable basis (Section 510(c)). In the same line, the Uniform
Commercial Code99 authorizes subordination under Section 1-209 and in
regard to the priority of liens, under Section 9-316. The UCC allows for
the alteration of statutory priorities by means of an agreement. Besides
these two types of subordination (contractual and equitable), there is also
a third type, i.e. legal subordination. Priorities and equitable and legal
subordinations are limited by law, while a contractual subordination is
the right of a creditor to subordinate the totality or a part of its credit to
other creditors.
The contractual or consensual subordination is the most common type
of subordination and requires the consent of the creditor that will
subordinate itself to other creditors. Usually, the consent is granted by
means of a written agreement between the debtor and the creditor. In
certain cases, it could also be performed by means of an agreement be-
tween creditors. A contractual subordination is governed by general con-
93. Debra J. Schnebel, Intercreditor and Subordination Agreements - A Practical
Guide, 118 BANKING L.J. 48, 48 (2001).
94. The risk/return trade-off translates in 'lower the risk, lower the return' and 'higher
the risk, higher the return'.
95. A parallelism between insolvency and sovereign debt restructuring on the particu-
lar issue of subordination is unavoidable even though it is worth stressing that a
sovereign cannot go bankrupt. It is done for illustration purposes only.
96. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2005).
97. The priorities between different secured claims are determined by the applicable
non-bankruptcy law.
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 510 (2005).
99. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a uniform law governing commercial
transactions (sale of goods, secured transactions and negotiable instruments) that
has been promulgated in an effort to harmonize the law. The Code has been
adopted in some form by every state in the United States.
2009]
768 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
tract law and therefore should comply with the usual requirements of a
contract (agreement, consideration, capacity, etc.). Although obvious, it
is important to stress that a characteristic element of a subordination
agreement is that the contracting party decides to subordinate itself, and
consequently, others benefit from this action.
Equitable subordination is a type of subordination imposed by the
courts based on the force of law for reasons of equity and fairness rather
than a contractual agreement. 100 It is an exceptional measure and must
meet three requisites: (1) a creditor is engaged in an inequitable conduct;
(2) the misconduct injured the other creditors or resulted in unfair advan-
tage; and (3) equitable subordination is not inconsistent with provisions
of the US Bankruptcy Code.10 1 As clearly stated in In re EMB Associ-
ates, Inc., the "[f]undamental aim of equitable subordination under Bank-
ruptcy Code is to undo or offset any inequity in claimed position of a
creditor that will produce injustice or unfairness to other creditors in
terms of bankruptcy results."' 01 2 The trustee, the debtor, the creditors, or
the court can compel the equitable subordination.'0 3 Examples of con-
duct that has justified equitable subordination include: fraud, illegality,
breach of fiduciary duties, undercapitalization, and claimant's use of
debtor as mere instrumentality or alter ego. 10 4 Wood argues that equita-
ble subordination occurs as the result of the misconduct of the creditor. 10 5
Legal subordination derives from the law, e.g. Section 510(b) or Sec-
tion 747 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 106 The pre-existent general rule
provides that in certain situations, the claim will be subordinated. These
pre-existent rules are known to all the parties prior to entering in a trans-
action or situation that might result in the subordination of a claim. It is
100. The foundation of equitable subordination lies in two Supreme Court cases, Taylor
v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1938) and Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295 (1939).
101. In re M & S Grading, Inc., 541 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2008); Custom Fuel Servs,
Inc. v. Lombas Indus., Inc., 805 F.2d 561, 566 (5th Cir. 1986); In the Matter of
Missionary Baptist Found. of Am., 712 F.2d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1983); In the Matter
of Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
102. In re EMB Assocs., Inc., 92 B.R. 9, 15 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1988); see also Bostian v.
Schapiro (In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co.), 144 F.2d 791, 800 (8th Cir.1944).
103. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 437-38 (West Publishing 1993).
104. Custom Fuel Servs., Inc. v. Lombas Indus., Inc., 805 F.2d 561, 566 (5th Cir. 1986);
Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Vessel Madam Chapel, 46 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Pride of Texas, 964 F.Supp. 986, 991 (E.D.Va. 1994); Wardley Int'l
Bank, Inc. v. Nasipit Bay Vessel, 841 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1988); Neptune Orient
Lines, Ltd. v. Halla Merchant Marine Co., Ltd., No. CIV. A. 97-3828, 1998 WL
128993, at *3 (E.D.La. Mar. 20, 1998); Nevi Mar. Co., Inc. v. MfV ALEXAN-
DER'S UNITY, No. CIV. A. 92-2561, 1993 WL 386257, at *3 (E.D.La. Sep. 21,
1993); First Bank & Trust v. MIV Point X, No. CIV. A. H-91-1178, 1993 WL
406052, at *3-4 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 03, 1992); Ost-West-Handel Bruno Bischoff GmbH
v. Project Asia Line, Inc., 970 F.Supp. 471, 486 (E.D.Va. 1997); United States v.
Pride of Texas, No. 2:92CV211, 2:93CV321, 1994 WL 913279, at *4 (E.D.Va. Oct.
05, 1994); Key Bank of Puget Sound v. Alaskan Harvester, 738 F.Supp. 398, 401
(W.D.Wash. 1989).
105. PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 270, (Street &
Maxwell 2d ed. 2007).
106. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 510(b), 747.
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important to mention that subordination only affects the priority of pay-
ment and not the right of payment. 10 7
United States domestic corporate bonds do not include a pari passu
clause because there is no need to do so. Why? Priorities are well estab-
lished by law and a creditor cannot be subordinated to another creditor
within the same category unless consent is provided (contractual subordi-
nation) or by statute (legal subordination or equitable subordination). 10 8
As noted by Hagan, the pari passu clause in sovereign debt has gener-
ally been understood to limit the legal subordination of debt. 10 9 In this
same sense, The New York Clearing House Association L.L.C. (an associ-
ation of some of the largest U.S. commercial banks) stated that pari passu
clauses apply to protect creditors against legal subordination to other un-
secured obligations of the debtor and eventually to provide certainty in
the event of involuntarily subordination. 1 0
Although it is fairly straightforward to obtain a favorable judgment,
enforcing it is a completely different matter. Although the litigator's im-
agination has no boundaries, a sovereign does not have many attachable
assets abroad. Even the few assets that are located abroad generally re-
ceive certain types of immunity. Therefore, unless certain exceptional
circumstances, apply a bondholder of a sovereign state would be better
off participating in a restructuring arrangement where it can have certain
leverage as a group. And, here is precisely where it is relevant for hold-
outs to try to invoke a breach of the pari passu clause. If that is the case,
it will increase their chances to collect.
Going back to the Argentine analysis, it can be argued that holdouts
were provided with the same exchange offer that the participating credi-
tors were provided, and were also advised of the possible outcome in the
event of refusing the exchange offer. Following this line of thinking, as-
suming arguendo it can be claimed that holdout creditors subordinated
themselves intentionally in order to trigger the pari passu clause: Subordi-
nation as a result of a 'no' action. In addition, it can be stated that al-
though the Padlock Law 'locked' the exchange offer, it did not affect the
holdouts since by not accepting the exchange offer holdout creditors
waved their right in the first place. Besides, holdouts creditors can still
resort to litigation to collect on their non-performing bond based on the
breach of contract as result of the default.
107. See In re Kreisler, 331 B.R. 364, 381 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); In re 203 N. LaSalle
St. P'ship, 246 B.R. 325, 332 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 2000).
108. It can be argued that the bedrock of equitable subordination is fairness and equity
and not the law but it is the law that authorizes the courts to provide equitable
subordination (§510(c)).
109. Sean Hagan, Designing A Legal Framework To Restructure Sovereign Debt, GE-
ORGETOWN J. OF INT'L L. (Winter, 2005).
110. See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae the New York Clearing House Association
L.L.C. in Support of Motion Pursuant to CPLR § 5240 to Preclude Plaintiff Judg-
ment Creditors from Interfering with Payments to Other Creditors, supra note 36,
at 5.
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The holdout creditor has two related although distinctive rights: (1)
the right to accept (or reject) an exchange offer; and (2) to recover its
credit invoking a breach of the pari passu clause. They are related be-
cause the common feature is the bond and its terms (prospectus and pro-
spectus supplement), but they are different since they derive from
different actions of the sovereign: (1) an exchange offer made by the
sovereign that gives the right to those holding the debt instrument to ac-
cept it or reject it; and (2) the breach of the pari passu clause as result of
an alteration in the ranking of claims within the same category of credi-
tors. Waiving the former (the right to enter the exchange offer) shall not
infringe or have any influence on the latter.
The party that voluntarily enters into a contract to subordinate its claim
makes an express demonstration of its will of not being equal to other
creditors in its same standing at the moment of payment (in the event of
liquidation). The creditor that enters into a subordination agreement re-
linquishes its pari passu right. Therefore, priority and subordination are
exceptions to the pari passu principle.
The holdouts did not waive their pari passu right; on the contrary-and
continuing with the assuming arguendo-it can be said that other credi-
tors altered the status of the holdouts by exchanging their debt instru-
ments for a new 'performing' instrument. If it could be claimed that the
holdout creditors subordinated themselves by a 'no' action, it can also be
argued that the participating bondholders in the exchange offer subordi-
nated the holdouts. None of the arguendo scenarios ('no' action subordi-
nation or the subordination of the holdouts as result of the exchange
offer) should cause any effect on the holdouts. In the case of Argentina,
however, the holdouts are different. Argentina expressly stated that the
bonds of the holdout creditors will remain 'non-performing.' Argentina
then passed a law by which the exchange offer was locked, indirectly
granting a legal priority to those creditors that entered the exchange
offer.
As noted by Tudor,'11 Buchheit, Pam, and the Financial Markets Law
Committee, 1 2 the pari passu clause was originally intended: (1) to pre-
vent the earmarking of revenues of the government towards a single cred-
itor; (2) against legal measures which have the effect of preferring one set
of creditors against the others (e.g. enacting a specific norm); and/or, (3)
against legal measures which discriminate between creditors creating an
involuntary subordination.
The earmarking of revenues has been curtailed by an expanded nega-
111. See John, supra, note 4, at 95-96.
112. See Fin. Market Law Comm't Issue 79, supra note 8. The role of the Financial
Markets Law Committee is to identify issues of legal uncertainty, or misunder-
standing, present and future, in the framework of the wholesale financial markets
which might give rise to material risks, and to consider how such issues should be
addressed (see http://www.fmlc.org/history.html).
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tive pledge clause113 (1 above). Legal measures adopted to create a pref-
erence for one set of creditors against others (2 above) has been
addressed by means of judicial decisions where it was concluded that US
Federal Courts do not need to refer to the actions or norms emanated
from a foreign government if there are connecting elements to the US
(e.g. place of payment or governing law). 114 The legal measures that can
lead to an involuntary subordination (3 above) can be curtailed by means
of an exhaustive due diligence of the issuer.
The Pari Passu Clause in Historical Perspective
Historical Purpose of the Pari
No. Passu Clause Market/Judicial Reaction-Solution
1 To prevent the earmarking of reve- Expanded negative pledge clause
nues of the government towards a
single creditor
2 Against legal measures which have Libra Bank Limited v. Banco
the effect of preferring one set of Nacional de Costa Rica S.A. and
creditors against the others (e.g. Allied Bank International v. Banco
enacting a specific norm) Credito Agricola de Cartago
3 Against legal measures which dis- Exhaustive due diligence of the
criminate between creditors creat- issuer
ing an involuntary subordination
(e.g. the Philippines and Spain)
The Argentine Padlock Law can be interpreted as falling within 2
above, i.e. a legal measure preferring one set of creditors against the
others, which was already addressed in the Libra Bank Limited v. Banco
Nacional de Costa Rica S.A.11 5 and Allied Bank International v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago.1 16
In Libra, the plaintiffs (seven banks 17) brought an action to recover
their share of principal amounts, plus interest, of a Forty Million US$
syndicated loan to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (Banco Nacional).
Banco Nacional was the defendant, a banking concern wholly owned by
the Costa Rican government that defaulted on the payments due under
the loan agreement. As its sole defense, Banco Nacional asserted that it
was barred from making any repayment by an act of the Costa Rican
government-a resolution from the Central Bank of Costa Rica and an
113. The inclusion of expanded negative pledge clauses was the market reaction to ac-
tion initiated by Citibank against Export-Import Bank of the United States, which
in the end was settled by the parties. See Citibank N.A. v. Export-Import Bank of
the United States, No. 76 Civ. 3514 (CBM) (SDNY Aug. 9, 1976).
114. See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd., 570 F. Supp. at 870; Allied Bank Int'l, 566 F. Supp. at
1440
115. Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 870.
116. Allied Bank, 757 F. 2d at ,517, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 281.
117. The seven plaintiffs are Libra Bank Limited; Libra International Bank S.A.; Banco
de la Provincia de Buenos Aires; Banco Espirito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa;
Banco de Vizcaya S.A.; Banque Internationale a Luxembourg S.A.; Banque
Rothschild; and, The National Bank of Washington. There were other nine banks
that took part in the loan as lenders but were not part in this action.
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Executive Decree-and that the court is barred from entering decision by
the act of state doctrine.
In Allied, Allied Bank International acted as the agent for thirty-nine
creditor banks to recover on promissory notes issued by Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, Banco Anglo Costarricense and Banco Nacional.
These three Costa Rican banks, the defendants, are wholly owned by the
Republic of Costa Rica and subject to the direct control of the Central
Bank of Costa Rica. While the action was still pending before the District
Court, the parties reached a rescheduling agreement and dismissed the
claim in July 1982. In September 1983, a refinancing agreement was exe-
cuted. Fidelity Union Trust Company of New Jersey, one of the members
of the Allied syndicate, did not accept the agreement and was the one
who managed to obtain a rehearing before the Court of Appeals, which
vacated its previous decision and overturned the District Court's
decision.
The banking laws of Costa Rica at that time provided that foreign state
transactions had to be authorized by the Central Bank of Costa Rica.
The Costa Rican Central Bank's resolution was adopted on August 27,
1981, to remedy Costa Rica's problems in servicing its external debts
(debts to foreign creditors in foreign currency), providing that only repay-
ments of external debts to multilateral international agencies would be
authorized. Subsequently, on November 24, 1981, a decree was enacted
prohibiting payment of principal or interest on external debt in foreign
currency without the prior approval of the Central Bank in consultation
with the Minister of Finance. This decree was applicable to all public
sector entities. The Costa Rican Central Bank subsequently refused to
authorize any foreign debt payments in U.S. dollars, thus precluding pay-
ment on the loan and the notes.
In both cases, the courts were faced with the question of whether the
act of state doctrine barred them from entering a decision. It is worthy
noticing that both the loan and the notes were payable in U.S. dollars in
New York and subject to New York law (similar to the Argentine bonds
held by some of the holdouts). 118
The Libra case has been very clear as to the validity of the claim of the
act of state doctrine resulting from the enactment of a norm by a foreign
state which affects a debt instrument not considered to be 'located' with a
foreign state. The court resorted to Menendez v. Saks, where it was
stated that '[flor purposes of the act of state doctrine, a debt is not 'lo-
cated' within a foreign state unless that state has the power to enforce or
collect it."119 It is important to note that the loan was issued in U.S. dol-
118. It is difficult to assert if all the debt instruments held by the holdouts have the
same features since there were 152 series, subject to eight different laws and de-
nominated in seven currencies (originally fourteen but resulted in seven due to the
adoption of the EUR).
119. Menendez, 485 F. 2d at 1364. Also, in the same line of thinking, see United Bank,
Ltd. v. Cosmic International, Inc. where it was ruled that '[aill that remained was
the right to repayment, which was to be made in New York City. This right existed
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lars, payable in the United States and subject to New York law. There-
fore, the court understood that the Costa Rican decrees purport to alter
the legal relations of the parties because they attempt to extinguish plain-
tiffs' rights120 and concluded that: "[A] foreign state's effective confisca-
tion of property, without compensation, is repugnant to the Constitution
and laws of the United States and,[the court] would not give effect to
Costa Rican currency decrees authorizing only repayment of external
debts to multilateral international agencies. 1 2 1
In addition, the Court of Appeals in Allied stated that the "[a]ct of
state doctrine operates to confer presumptive validity on certain acts of
foreign sovereigns by rendering nonjusticiable claims that challenge such
acts." 122 Under the traditional application of the act of state doctrine, the
principle of judicial refusal of examination of sovereign's acts applies only
to a taking by a foreign sovereign of property within its own territory.
12 3
When the property is within the US at the time of the attempted confisca-
tion (situs of the debt), however, US courts will only give effect to the
foreign state acts of state if they are consistent with the policy and law of
the US.124 Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that:
[the] [a]ct of state doctrine did not apply to preclude judicial exami-
nation of Costa Rican decrees which conditioned all payments of ex-
ternal debt on express approval from Central Bank of Costa Rica,
which refused to authorize any foreign debt payments in United
States dollars, thus precluding payment on promissory notes issued
by Costa Rican banks, where situs of the debts when the decrees
were promulgated was in United States.1
25
Finally, it is worth noticing that in Allied it was stressed that:
[T]he [United States] has an interest in ensuring that creditors enti-
tled to payment in the United States in United States dollars under
before December 16, 1971, the date the new Bangladesh government gained con-
trol of East Pakistan. The act of state doctrine is inapplicable because the situs of
the debts was New York..." United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic International, Inc., 392
F.Supp. 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y.1975).
120. See Libra, 570 F. Supp. at 878.
121. Libra, 570 F. Supp. at 878; see also United Bank, 542 F.2d at 873; Menendez, 485
F.2d at 1364; Republic of Iraq, 353 F.2d at 51.
122. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 520, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 281.
123. See Libra, 570 F. Supp at 877.
124. See e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank of New York, 658 F.2d 903,
908 (2d Cir. 1981) (Kearse, J.) (quoting Republic of Iraq v. First National City
Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027, 86
S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966)); see also First National Bank, et al. v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 901 (2d Cir. 1981); Menendez,,485 F.2d 1355,
1364, reversed on other grounds sub nomine; Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976); United Bank,
542 F.2d 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1976), affirming and modifying, 392 F.Supp. 262
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F.Supp. 18, 20
(S.D.N.Y.1976); F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F.Supp. 481, 483-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), affirmed per curiam, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub
nomine, Brush & Bloch v. Republic of China, 389 U.S. 830, 88 S.Ct. 95, 19 L.Ed.2d
88 (1967).
125. Allied Bank, 757 F. 2nd 516, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 281.
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contracts subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts may as-
sume that, except under the most extraordinary circumstances, their
rights will be determined in accordance with recognized principles of
contract law126
and that an unilateral attempt to repudiate private, commercial obliga-
tions is inconsistent with the orderly resolution of international debt
problems. These arguments were later affirmed and restated in Pravin
Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular del Peru;127 and National Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. People's Republic of the Congo.128 It is
worth noticing that in between the Allied Court of Appeals decision and
its re-hearing; an article published by the Financial Times, included in its
title the following statement: "New York law unsafe for loan agree-
ments."'1 29 Moreover, the opening lines of the press article include a
statement by a leading European law authority stating that:
IT'S MONSTROUS, it's a scandal, nothing like this has happened
before! From now on no-one in his right mind will specify New York
law and New York as a place of litigation in a loan agreement. 130
The situs of the debt was New York and, hence, the act of state doc-
trine did not preclude the courts inquiring into the validity of the Costa
Rican foreign currency decree despite the fact that it was enacted upon
an emergency situation and granting a legal priority to multilateral inter-
national agencies, which already enjoy an ad-hoc priority. Therefore, it
can be concluded that the Argentine Padlock Law can also be questioned
by U.S. courts since the act of state doctrine would not apply.13'
The most authoritative arguments against the discrimination by the
lender where made by Buchheit on three different occasions (one jointly
with Walker). This author clearly stated that the purpose of the pari
passu clause is to prevent the creation of a preferred creditor:
A pari passu covenant will, however, restrict the borrower from sub-
ordinating in a formal way the debt being incurred (or restructured)
pursuant to the agreement containing this clause in favor of some
126. Id. at 521-522.
127. Pravin Banker Assoc., Ltd. v. Banco Popular, 895 F.Supp. 660, 664 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
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other external obligation.132
[I]f a sovereign borrower intends as a practical matter to discrimi-
nate among its creditors in terms of payments, the pari passu under-
taking will at least prevent the sovereign from attempting to
legitimize the discrimination by enacting laws or decrees which pur-
port to bestow a senior status on certain indebtedness or give a legal
preference to certain creditors over others...133
The purpose of the pari passu clause is to ensure that the borrower
does not have, nor will it subsequently create, a class of creditors
whose claims against the borrower will rank legally senior to the in-
debtedness represented by the loan agreement. 134
The Padlock Law provided a basis for considering an alteration in the
legal ranking of the existing unsecured creditors resulting in the involun-
tary subordination of the holdouts by means of the positive action by
other lenders ratified by law. The relevant issue is the Padlock Law, a
legal measure adopted by the Argentine government. The arguendo ac-
tions or 'no' actions are irrelevant because without the Padlock Law there
is no subordination. In all, it is obvious that Argentina's ultimate purpose
by passing the Padlock Law was to regain the confidence of the majority
participating creditors and to achieve a more successful restructuring of
its debt (not with the intention of giving a legal preference to the partici-
pating creditors over the holdouts). When applied to inter-creditor pro-
ceedings, the established legal principle of pari passu provides that all
participants comprising a class of creditors shall be entitled to participate
equally in stature and without preference. As discussed previously, the
obligation imposed on a sovereign debtor under the ranking interpreta-
tion of the pari passu clause was generally to prevent sovereigns from
adopting legal measures which have the effect of preferring one set of
creditors against the others. Unfortunately, disregarding the conse-
quence of such formal legislative action, Argentina then made itself more
vulnerable; a legal subordination of the holdout creditors was formally
made that might give rise to a breach of the pari passu clause. As a re-
sult, the holdouts can meet their end by resorting to litigation in the hope
of obtaining a better outcome than that of the exchange offer.
Moreover, Articles 4 and 6 of the Padlock Law take positive actions
towards the alteration of the rights of the holdouts. Article 4 instructs the
executive branch to adopt all the necessary actions to delist the bonds.
Article 6 states that all bonds deposited that are part of a claim and
where presented before a judge to collect will be de facto converted into
132. Mark A. Walker & Lee Buchheit, Legal Issues in the Restructuring of Commercial
Bank Loans to Sovereign Borrowers, in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL
RISK 139, 146, Euromoney, (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner, eds 1984).
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83 (2nd ed., 2000).
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Par Step-up Bonds due in 2038.135
In Greek mythology, Sisyphus was a competent and astute king of Co-
rinth who was considered capable of challenging even the Gods. Sisy-
phus, however, had angered the Gods so much that they condemned him
to the task of eternally pushing a rock up a mountain. Upon Sisyphus'
arrival at the summit of the mountain, his load-the rock-rolled along
the slope by which he had just ascended. Sisyphus had to return to the
base of the mountain again and again to repeat his useless efforts. Albert
Camus analyzed the myth of Sisyphus and stated that the Gods had
thought that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and hope-
less labor.136 Argentina's situation might be that of Sisyphus-futile and
hopeless-if a solution is not found to deal with the holdouts.
In In re Pinnacle Brands, Inc., it was stated that "[w]hile bankruptcy
courts, as courts of equity, have the power to equitably subordinate
claims, there is no statutory provision permitting bankruptcy courts to
elevate the priority of an existing claim."'1 37 The same should apply to a
sovereign as well. This is precisely why Argentina might face litigation as
result of the breach of the pari passu clause on valid grounds and not
based on a wrongful interpretation of the pari passu clause.
In summary, it can be said that the pari passu clause mistakenly mi-
grated from secured private lending to unsecured sovereign lending.
Once rooted in unsecured sovereign lending instruments it faced provi-
sions like the ones in Spain or the Philippines and become a 'must have'
provision in this type of debt instrument. Then, pari passu clauses stayed
in place out of fear of earmarking revenues and the risk that the sover-
eign preferred one group of creditors over another. These fears, how-
ever, were tackled by an expanded negative pledge clause and the Libra
and Allied cases. Therefore, if a proper due diligence was conducted
there was no need to have a pari passu clause except in exceptional cir-
cumstances like the ones in Spain or the Philippines. Unfortunately, a
misguided interpretation of the pari passu clause in the Elliot case opened
the door to litigation on unjust grounds (payment interpretation or broad
interpretation of the pari passu clause). It was an 'aberration,' 138 but one
that caused furor. The problem was that in Elliot there was no breach of
the pari passu clause, just a wrong understanding of its meaning. In the
case of Argentina, the whole story is different because the language can
be correctly interpreted as a breach of the pari passu clause in its ranking
or narrow form. The importance of this article lies precisely in explaining
the different interpretations of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt
135. Although the Padlock Law does nor delimit the jurisdiction and expressly says
'any jurisdiction', this is only applicable within the territory of the Republic of
Argentina.
136. See Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, EDITORIAL LOSADA, 2002, at 129-133.
137. In re Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 259 B.R. 46, Bankr.D.Del. 2001.
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instruments in context to provide a clear understanding of the issue for
the sake of the international capital markets.
IX. SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Usually, an exchange offer has a termination date, a date until which
bondholders can exchange their 'defaulted' old bonds for new bonds.
Another feature is the possibility of leaving the exchange offer open for
those creditors that did not participate. The non participation of bond-
holders does not necessarily means that they decided to holdout, it can
mean that bondholders were not aware of the exchange offer.139 There-
fore, it would be convenient and in good faith to leave the exchange offer
open for those creditors that are willing to join the exchange offer after
closure. This might pose a threatening speculative dilemma to the sover-
eign, because bondholders would not enter the restructuring and would
wait to see the participation degree. For that reason, the announcement
of this feature should be performed once the required majority or the
desired threshold by the sovereign has been achieved.
In this respect, it is important to note that Argentina not only closed
the exchange offer tendering period but also 'locked-it' by passing the so-
called Padlock Law. The fact that Argentina passed Law 26,017 prohibit-
ing future offers to the holdout creditors could be interpreted as a formal
subordination of creditors. The fact that these creditors where subordi-
nated could be interpreted as a violation of the pari passu clause. Thus,
holdout creditors affected as the result of this possible subordination
might have a right to claim a breach of the pari passu clause. As
Buchheit has noted, "you can do pretty much whatever you want in dis-
criminating among creditors (in terms of who gets paid and who does
not) but do not try to justify your behavior by taking steps that purport to
establish a legal basis for discrimination."' 140
Following this line of thinking, another relevant fact of the Argentine
saga that could also be considered as discrimination to bondholders is the
fact that the Argentine government offered more favorable terms to the
Argentine pension funds. 141 The more favorable terms were represented
in certain accounting benefits granted to Argentine pension funds.
Therefore, the net present value of the exchange offer was not the same
to the Argentine pension funds than to other creditors. The rationale
behind this measure was to ensure the participation of the pension funds
in the restructuring since they held approximately twenty percent of the
139. As practitioner experienced that when trying to delist a company some stockhold-
ers were not able to be traced and the intervention of a court was required. This
problem is amplified in the case of a sovereign where the bondholding is atomized.
140. Lee Buchheit, supra note 133.
141. See Ismad1 Bermudez, Hay 10 millones de argentinos alcanzados por el canje de la
deuda', DIARIO CLARfN, Jan. 13, 2005, available at http://impresion.clarin.com/im-
primir7.jsp?pagid=90312; Clave: anuncian un primer paso para salir del default,
INFOBAE, Oct. 7, 2004, available at http://www.infobae.com/notas/notajimprimir.
php?Idx=144306.
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defaulted debt. This might not only affect the pari passu clause but also
the non-discriminatory treatment of foreign nationals and foreign finan-
cial institutions (i.e. the principle of 'national treatment') under WTO-
GATS142 principles.
All these potential threats could have been avoided in first place by not
including a pari passu clause in the debt instruments. Could the inclusion
of a pari passu clause have been avoided? The answer would be 'yes'
except in the cases of Spain and the Philippines' debt instruments (and
any other jurisdiction that allows the creditors to create post-issuance
preferences).
It can be said that the pari passu clause mistakenly migrated from se-
cured private lending to unsecured sovereign lending. Once rooted in
unsecured sovereign lending instruments, it faced certain provisions like
those of Spain or the Philippines that allow the creditor to create an ex-
post priority. For that reason, the pari passu clause had a raison d'itre
and become a popular provision in this type of debt instrument. Then,
pari passu clauses stayed in unsecured debt instruments due to other the
fears: (1) the earmarking revenues or (2) the risk of the sovereign prefer-
ring a group of creditors over another. These two fears were tackled by
an expanded negative pledge clause and the Libra and Allied cases, re-
spectively. Therefore, if a proper due diligence was conducted there was
no need to have a pari passu clause unless in limited exceptional circum-
stances. A misguided interpretation of the pari passu clause opened the
door to litigation on incorrect grounds. In Argentina's case, however, the
whole story could be correctly interpreted as a breach of the pari passu
clause in its ranking or narrow form. If the Padlock Law is interpreted as
a sovereign creating a priority in favor of certain creditors against others
(resulting in an involuntary subordination of a group of creditors), de-
spite the fact that it is already recognized in legal precedents, the pari
passu clause will perpetuate in unsecured sovereign debt instruments.
142. Article XVII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
